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Globalization creates new opportunities for firms to invest abroad and many 
economies are making active efforts to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
in order to promote economic growth. Decisions to invest abroad depend on a 
complex set of factors, but the least corrupt countries may attract more foreign 
direct investment because they provide a more favorable climate for investors. 
In this paper we investigate the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 73 
countries, over the period 1998-2008. Our results suggest that countries where 
corruption is lower, the FDI inflows are greater, and so controlling corruption 
may be an important strategy for increase FDI inflows.
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¿La corrupción inhibe La inversión extranjera 
Directa?
La globalización ha creado nuevas oportunidades para invertir en el extranjero 
y muchas economías están haciendo esfuerzos para atraer inversión extranjera 
directa (IED) con el fin de promover el crecimiento económico. La decisión 
de invertir en el extranjero depende de un complejo conjunto de factores. No 
obstante, los países menos corruptos pueden atraer más inversión extranjera 
directa, ya que proporcionan un clima más favorable para los inversionistas. En 
este trabajo se investiga el impacto de la corrupción sobre los flujos de IED 
en 73 países, en el período 1998-2008. Los resultados sugieren que los países 
donde la corrupción es menor, las entradas de IED son mayores, por lo que el 
control de la corrupción puede ser una estrategia importante para aumentar 
los flujos de IED.
Palabras clave: corrupción, Inversión extranjera directa, crecimiento económico.
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Introduction
Every country wants to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), because it is 
expected to have favourable effects on the economy: on income, technology, know-
how, management skills, local market competition, job opportunities, global market, 
and economic growth. FDI inflows are affected by economic factors such as the size 
of the economy, its growth rate, but also by its business facilitation and institutional 
framework. In this sense, corruption may also be considered an important determinant 
of FDI. Corruption potentially reduces investment (Mauro, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 
1996) and, particularly, foreign investment. Uncertainty increases in environments 
with higher corruption, as does the cost of doing business. Functioning as a tax 
on business (due to the increase of time and resources spent to deal with complex 
regulations and bribes to bureaucrats), the cost is often transferred to consumers 
through higher prices or lower quality of goods and services, which affect negatively 
the private sector’s labour market, efficiency, competition, innovation and, in 
particular, economic growth. These increased business costs may also cause a shift 
from part of the economic activity into the informal sector, in order to avoid the 
use of public services as much as possible.
The working definition of corruption by the World Bank is the abuse of public 
power for private benefit. Transparency International (1996) adds “corruption 
involves behavior on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians 
or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or 
those close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them” (p. 
1). Corruption, which can result from one or several factors, such as excessive 
bureaucracy, high discretion in the formulation and implementation of policies, 
inefficiency and slowness of the legal system, low wages in the civil service and 
lower degree of economic freedom, potentially affects many aspects of economy, 
namely foreign investment and economic growth; and has been a concern for some 
international organizations such as the World Bank, Transparency International, the 
International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Corruption is a phenomenon that nowadays affects not 
only developing economies, but also more advanced ones. Through international 
strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions, the globalization process has led to new 
standards in government and business ethics, and corruption creates obstacles to that 
process, making the control of corruption an increasingly important subject.
Although we acknowledge corruption as a multifaceted phenomenon, it can 
be regarded as an economic problem, since it has high costs for the private and 
public sectors in the long run. The purpose of this article is to study the impact of 
corruption on FDI inflows in a panel of 73 countries, during the period 1998-2008, 
controlled by economic and political variables. Beside traditional economic variables 
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that potentially explain FDI inflows (GDP, economic growth or human capital), we 
also study the influence of good governance in host countries transparency, but also 
its effect on government effectiveness and political stability. Beyond these political 
aspects, the assurance of property rights and the legal framework for doing business 
may have an important role on the decision to invest abroad, so we also introduce 
business freedom and rule of law indicators.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the major FDI and corruption 
trends. Section 2 reviews some existing literature on FDI inflows determinants. 
Section 3 details the empirical model used for estimation, data and samples. Section 
4 presents and analyzes the econometric results for FDI and corruption. Section 6 
presents our conclusions.
1. Corruptions and FDI
Globalization is one of the major trends of the last two decades, and because of that 
FDI has grown all over the world. As Dunning (2003, p. 279) states: “FDI flows still 
remain one of the most constitutive elements of the global economy”. FDI inflows 
grew at an annual average of 14.7% in the 70’s, 19.1% in the 80’s, 20.8% in the 90’s 
and 10% in the first decade of the 21st century. In transition economies, although 
the level of FDI inflow is significantly inferior to the one seen in developing and 
developed countries, their average annual growth rates are significantly higher in the 
80’s and 90’s (Figure 1).
Figure 1  
FDI inflows: average annual growth (%) in developed, transition and  
developing economies
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The share of inward and outward FDI stocks (the value of their capital and reserves 
stock, including retained profits, attributable to the parent company, plus the parent 
company affiliates net indebtedness) grew from 12,2% of the GDP in 1980 to 48,6% 
in 2000, and 63,3% in 2009 (Table 1). The world FDI stock is ten times more in 
2008 than it was in 1990 (Figure 2).
Table 1 
Inward and Outward FDI stocks % of GDP, selected years
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward
World 6,6 5,6 8,4 7,7 9,4 9,9 11,4 12,3 23,4 25,2
Developing 
economies
11,6 3,6 14,6 3,5 13,3 3,8 14,3 5,7 24,8 12,7
Transition 
economies
n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 0,2 0,6 2,0 0,9 15,4 5,8
Developed 
economies
5,1 6,1 6,6 8,9 9,0 11,3 10,9 14,1 23,1 28,9
G8 4,2 6,2 5,6 8,5 7,8 10,8 9,0 13,0 20,2 27,1
G20 4,2 5,9 5,9 7,7 7,9 9,7 9,1 11,5 19,3 23,1
n.a. - not available
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward
World 25,4 27,4 29,0 32,0 32,5 35,1 25,5 26,8 30,5 32,8
Developing 
economies
25,2 12,3 26,8 14,2 30,1 16,6 24,5 14,1 27,9 14,6
Transition 
economies
25,3 14,2 28,5 16,3 37,3 21,6 18,2 9,9 27,7 16,1
Developed 
economies
25,4 32,6 29,8 38,8 33,3 42,7 26,3 32,9 31,8 41,2
G8 21,0 29,4 24,5 34,5 26,1 38,4 18,7 27,2 23,4 35,2
G20 20,2 24,4 22,8 28,0 24,1 30,6 17,7 21,8 22,1 28,0
Source: UNCTAD
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Figure 2 
World FDI stock (inward), US dollars at current prices and current exchange rates 
in hundred millions, 1980-2008
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Concerns with corruption have arisen with globalization, since international 
strategic alliances as mergers and acquisitions depend much more on mutual 
trust. Differences in business standards, government ethics and regulation make 
that process more difficult. Traditionally, corruption was a typical phenomenon of 
underdeveloped or developing countries, but at present the reality is very different. 
Corruption indicators show large differences between developing economies and 
emerging economies, but also among the most developed. Corruption is a problem, 
and constitutes a major challenge even for the richest countries. Therefore, disparity 
in levels of corruption among the group of the most industrialized and developed 
countries of the world should be highlighted: Canada is in the top eight of least 
corrupt countries (amongst a total of 180), Germany in 14th, Japan and United 
Kingdom are tied at the 17th spot, the United States of America is in the 19th, France 
24th, but Italy holds the 63 rd position and Russia the 146th. When we consider the 
G20 (which also includes the emerging countries) representing 90% of world GDP 
and 80% of the world trade, differences are greater, with the exemption of Australia 
(in 8th position): South Korea (39th), South Africa (55th), Saudi Arabia (63rd), Turkey 
(61st), Brazil (75th), China (79th), India (84th), Mexico (89th), and Indonesia (111th). 
Among the countries of G20 that are members of the European Union (EU), 
Nordic countries lead public administration transparency, and some transition and 
developed economies (Bulgaria, Romania and Greece) show very high levels of 
corruption (the highest of the EU), placing them in the 71st worldwide position, 
according to Transparency International. 
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Among the 27 EU member states, there are economies in transition like Slovenia, 
Estonia and Cyprus, which corruption levels are relatively lower than some southern 
EU-15 countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece). 
Figure 3 
Corruption Perception Index, 2009
New Zeland
Sweden
Singapore
Switzerland
Netherlands
Finland
Iceland
Canada
Australia
Norway
Luxembourg
Ireland
Germany
Austria
United Kingdom
Japan
United States
Belgium
Viet Nam
Chile
Estonia
Spain
Israel
Portugal
Botswana
Mauritius
Costa Rica
Cameroon
0,0 2,0 4,0 6,0 8,010,0
Denmark
Poland
Jordan
Slovakia
Namibia
Malaysia
Latvia
Turkey
Italy
Tunisia
Ghana
Romania
Greece
Bulgaria
Peru
Colombia
Brazil
China
Thailand
India
El Salvador
Mexico
Malawi
Zambia
Senegal
Argentina
Egypt
Viet Nam
Bolivia
Tanzania
Uganda
Nigeria
Philippines
Belarus
Bangladesh
Zimbabwe
Ukraine
Russia
Kenya
Ecuador
Cameroon
Venezuela
0,0 2,0 4,0 6,0 8,0 10,0
Czech Republic
South Africa
Cote d Ivoire
Source: Transparency International 
Note: Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt), so 
higher levels actually reflect lower corruption.
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Figure 4 compares FDI inflows in total world percentages and the Corruption Perception 
Index for 73 countries (this research sample) and shows that countries, which attract 
more FDI, show low levels of corruption, although China, Brazil, Russia and Italy 
had in average high levels of corruption and important FDI inflows.
Figure 4  
FDI inflows (total world percentages) and Corruption Perception Index, 73 
countries (average 1998-2008)
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2. Determinants of FDI and Corruption
Despite the complexity of the decision to invest abroad, UNCTAD (1998) summarizes 
FDI determinants in: i) economic conditions of the host country (which are 
different depending on the motive of the enterprise: natural resource-seeking, 
market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and asset-augmenting objectives); ii) government 
policies (policy framework towards the private sector, trade, industry and FDI); and 
iii) the investment strategies of Multinational Enterprises (MNE).
The main determinant FDI variables used in economic research are location or pull 
factors (as the size of the market and the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)), economic stability, degree of openness of an economy, as well as several 
institutional variables, and push factors, relating to conditions in the source country. 
If FDI is a market-seeking project, the objective is to set up companies to supply 
goods and services to the host market. An important group of traditional economic 
variables, determinant of inward FDI (mainly for those who are market-oriented) is 
the market size of the host country, both in absolute (GDP) and relative terms (growth 
of GDP). When the host country market is large, the cost of distribution will be lower 
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if production and distribution are near the consumer. Host countries with a larger 
market size, higher income per capita and faster growth allows companies to exploit their 
advantages. This holds true not only for market-seeking FDI projects, but also for export-oriented, 
because it will provide spill-over effects and economies of scale (OECD, 2000).
The empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that FDI inflows react positively to 
the host country’s market size, although the results are mixed. Several studies find a 
positive and significant correlation between the level of GDP and FDI (Bhasin et al, 
1994; UNCTAD, 1998; Morisset, 2000; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Nonnenberg 
and Mendonça, 2004), meanwhile other researchers de not only use the level of 
GDP but also the growth rate to show that the level of output (or the GDP per 
capita) and the growth prospects play an important role in FDI attracting (Wang 
and Swain, 1995; UNCTAD, 1998; Agiomirgianakis et al, 2006, the last using the 
GDP per capita and the growth rate). Lipsey (1999) and Agiomirgianakis et al (2006) 
also found that higher per capita income attracts FDI inflows, while Edwards (1990) 
and Jaspersen et al (2000) found the effects to be negative for developing countries. 
Loree and Guisinger (1995), Wei (2000) and Quazi (2007) found the effects to be 
statistically insignificant. According to Globerman and Shapiro (2002), the GDP per 
capita is, in many cases, insignificant or has the wrong sign, because it also reflects the 
implicit wage rate (which is negatively correlated to FDI) since they are correlated 
to productivity levels.
Nevertheless, the UNCTAD (1996) concludes that, as a consequence of globaliza-
tion and economic integration, traditional FDI determinants such as the size of 
national markets, has not disappeared but declined in importance. The absence of 
educated workers can prevent FDI inflows, because the access to a skilled workforce 
is essential. The location advantages of a country can be improved by policies which 
raise the quality of human capital. The effects of human capital on FDI inflows in 
the empirical literature are not consensual. Hanson (1996), Mody and Srinivasan 
(1998), Noorbakhsh et al (2001), Globerman and Shapiro (2002) and Agiomirgia-
nakis et al (2006) suggest that the effects of human capital on FDI are positive. For 
Noorbakhsh et al (2001), human capital is not only one the most important deter-
minants but its importance has become greater through time. But others authors 
found the effects to be statistically insignificant (Root and Ahmed, 1979; Schneider 
and Frey, 1985; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; and Quazi, 2007). For Guntlach (1995), ap-
pud in Agiomirgianakis et al (2006:7), this can be explained by the fact that educa-
tion “creates externalities and spill-over effects in production, which are hard to be 
captured using standard sets of variables of human capital accumulation”.
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Some papers, both theoretical and empirical, have pointed out the relationship 
between international trade and FDI. The greater the degree of openness, the 
larger the expected FDI flows, because more markets are available for exporters and 
resource allocation is more efficient, providing economic welfare gains. Nevertheless, there are 
mechanisms and policies that influence the relationship between these two variables, such 
as preferential free trade agreements and unilateral reductions in tariffs, which make 
that relationship complex (Ponce, 2006). Several authors found a significant positive 
relationship between FDI inflows and the degree of openness (Gastanaga et al, 1998; 
Nonnenberg and Mendonça, 2004; Agiomirgianakis et al, 2006; and Mathur and 
Singh, 2013). 
Economic instability, usually represented by the inflation rate, may inhibit inward 
FDI, because investors prefer to invest in economies with a lesser degree of 
uncertainty and in more stable economies. Negative and significant effects on FDI 
inflows were found by Nonnenberg and Mendonça (2004), Kahai (2004), and Al-
Sadig (2009), despite some authors found that inflation is not statistically significant 
(as Ponce, 2006).
Although the effects of taxes on FDI inflow may vary by type of taxes, tax treatment 
in both the host and home FDI countries, and ways of addressing double taxation, 
it is usually admitted that higher taxes discourage FDI. Hartman’s study (1984), first 
about this subject, suggests that certain types of FDI may not be very sensitive to 
taxes. More recently, De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) found a median tax-elasticity 
of FDI of -3.3 across 25 studies, that is, a 1 percent-point reduction in the host-
country tax rate raises foreign direct investment in that country by 3.3 percent. 
A country’s economic performance over time is also determined by its political, 
institutional and legal environment (OECD, 2001). Political stability, developed 
institutions and legal systems improves its investment environment, and so, create a 
favourable climate for FDI, although Sethi et al (2003:318) considers that «the role 
of governments in providing an environment conducive to FDI cannot be over-
emphasized», it may also be very important in attracting FDI. Governance consists on 
the “traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised in a country” (World Bank, 
2007, p. 2), involving political, institutional and economic reforms. Good governance enables 
a responsible resources management with the objective of economic growth, social development, 
and reducing inequalities. A stable political and economic environment, an efficient rule of 
law, sound infrastructures creates better conditions for investment, namely foreign. According to 
Barro (1991), political instability creates an uncertain economic environment, which 
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has a negative impact in long-term planning, and thus, reduces economic growth 
and investment opportunities. 
Several authors show empirical evidence that political, institutional and legal 
environments are important to explain differences in growth and productivity 
among countries (Knack and Keefer, 1995; 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Kaufmann 
et al, 1999; Talbott and Roll, 2001; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). Many studies on 
FDI determinants, include nowadays some variable of political environment (Mody 
and Srinivasan, 1998; Tuman and Emmert, 1999; Altomonte, 2000; Bevan and Estrin, 
2000; Morisset ,2000; Stevens, 2000; Hess, 2004; Magnus and Fosu, 2008), although 
measured in different ways. As a consequence, it is difficult to generalize the results, 
which may present mixed conclusions. Nigh (1985), Edwards (1990), Magnus and 
Fosu (2008), among others, emphasized the positive effect of political stability and 
they have found that political instability has a significantly detrimental effect on FDI 
inflows. For Hess (2004), in the choice of investment locations, political instability is 
more important than democracy. On the contrary, other authors found the effects to 
be insignificant (Loree and Guisinger, 1995; Jaspersen et al, 2000; and Hanson, 1996). 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002)1 show that investment in governance infrastructure 
(its political, institutional and legal environment) attracts foreign capital, but also 
creates the conditions for domestic multinational corporations to emerge and invest 
abroad. For Mathur and Singh (2013) democracy is not so important as economic 
freedom, because investors want to assure that they are protected by the state but 
unconstrained by it.
Corruption may affect negatively the country’s ability to attract foreign investment, 
as it works as a tax on profits (Bardhan, 1997): the costs of doing business raises and 
the expected investments profitability decreases. Mo (2001) believes that corruption 
undermines the innovators who need to deal with public services (goods with a 
rigid demand), becoming the main targets of corruption, and they have to pay high 
bribes, since they do not have established lobbies or great influence power.
There is empirical evidence that corruption has a negative impact in several 
important determinants of FDI as investment (Mauro, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 
1996); the quality of public infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997), health care and 
education services (Gupta et al, 2000), and economic growth (Mauro, 1995, 1996; 
1 In this study they conclude that government infrastructures are subject to diminishing returns, so 
that the benefits, in terms of inflows, are most pronounced for smaller and developing economies.
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Brunetti, 1997; Poirson, 1998; Li et al, 2000; Mo, 2001; Del Monte and Pagagni, 
2001; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Abed and Davoodi, 
2002; Méon and Sekkat, 2005; and Castro, 2008). 
Some recent empirical studies provide evidence of a negative relationship between 
corruption and FDI inflows (Hines, 1995; Wei, 1997, 2000; Habib and Zurawicki, 
2002; Voyer and Beamish, 2004; Hakkala et al, 2008; Al-Sadig, 2009; Schudel, 2010), 
while others fail to find any significant relationship (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Abed 
and Davoodi, 2002; Akçay, 2001). Wei (2000) in a sample of forty-five host countries 
and fourteen source countries, for the period 1990-1991, concludes how important 
corruption is on FDI: he found that a tax rate rise on multinational firms has the 
same negative impact on FDI as a rise of the corruption level.
These contrasting results may also depend on the degree of corruption. Caetano 
and Caleiro (2007) and Han (2006) found that corruption is negatively correlated 
with FDI only in high-level corruption countries; in countries with low-levels of 
corruption the influence on FDI is not so evident. 
3. Sample, model and data 
The empirical research on the impact of corruption on FDI inflows is based on the 
following regression equation:
, , 1 , 2 , 3 , ,
1 1= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
k k
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i i
FDI c COR X Yβ β β ε
Where FDI is the level of inward FDI (in logs) received by country i, at time period t, 
and COR is the corruption measured by the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency 
International. cit is a parameter specific for each country, Xit is a vector of economic factors, and 
Yit a vector of political factors of the country i, which are control variables, that is, a set of FDI 
determinants other than corruption. The choice of the control variables was guided by previous 
empirical studies on the determinants on FDI, discussed in section 3.
The Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International ranges from 0 (most corrupt) 
to 10 (least corrupt), so it is important to note that since higher levels reflect lower corruption, a 
positive estimated coefficient for corruption ( 1β ) reflects a negative impact on FDI.
Among the economic explanatory variables of FDI inflows, we include the GDP, 
the average rate of GDP over the previous five years, the degree of trade openness 
(measured by the ratio of imports and exports on GDP), the rate of enrollment in 
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secondary education as a proxy of human capital, inflation as a proxy for economic 
instability, labor productivity and the highest marginal tax rate on corporate. It is 
also considered the political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, business 
freedom, rule of law and government effectiveness (see Appendix for data source 
and definition of the variables). The panel is composed of 73 countries, which 
include emerging markets, developing and developed economies, over the period 
1998-2008. The sample size was constrained by the lack of data availability, but the 
total number of observations varies between 454 and 764, which is sufficient to 
produce robust estimates.
4. Econometric results and analysis
Table 2 reports the results of the Fixed Effects GLS regression that investigates 
whether corruption is a significant determinant of FDI inflows or not. 
The corruption coefficients are statistically significant in all regressions and with a 
positive sign: the results suggest a negative impact of corruption on FDI. When controlling 
for several variables, the main result doesn’t change, as the coefficient of corruption maintains 
its significance. A one point increase in the corruption level causes a reduction of FDI 
inflows between 0.13 and 0.245 percent.
Regressions of FDI inflows on various economic and political characteristics of the 
host country, suggests that the host country market size, the degree of openness, the 
corporate marginal tax, and political stability are significant determinants of the ability 
of the host country to attract FDI. Our estimates reveal that foreign investment is 
influenced by the market size, in terms of GDP: the coefficient on the GDP term 
is highly significant in all the equations, and positive. Foreign investors will focus in 
countries where the size of the market is large enough to guarantee the profitability of the 
project. However, the real growth rate is not always significant: this seems to signify that 
if large markets attract more FDI, “the past growths rates are apparently not projected 
into the future by potential investors” (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 135). 
The results also suggest that markets which are more open are likely to attract 
foreign firms. More open economies potentially offer a more efficient allocation of resources, 
providing economic welfare gains. In all regressions, trade openness is statistically significant 
in the expected direction. Other economic factors, such as tax policy are also important 
determinants of FDI: a one percent point increase in the highest corporate marginal tax means 
a decrease of foreign direct investment between 0.025% and 0.027%. As in other similar 
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empirical studies, the role played by human capital, as a significant determinant of 
FDI inflows, is inconclusive. Other variables considered in the model, as labour 
productivity and inflation, do not produce conclusive results.
Business freedom, that is, a low burden of regulation that facilitate the ability to 
start, operate and close a business (Heritage Foundation), is a policy that promotes 
foreign investment. The coefficient of this variable is positive and significant at the 
10 percent level. The examination of the coefficients of political stability confirms 
previous findings, where countries with high political stability attract more foreign 
investment, because it decreases uncertainty. The coefficient of government 
effectiveness - which evaluates the quality of public services, the capacity of the 
civil service and its independence from political pressures, but also the quality of 
policy formulation – is significant although negatively correlated with FDI inflows.
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Table 2 
Regression results: panel (fixed-effects) estimations Dependent variable: Log( FDI inflows)
 Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(1)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(2)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(3)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(4)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(5)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(6)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(7)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(8)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(9)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(10)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(11)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(12)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(13)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(14)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(15)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(16)
Coefficient 
(t-student) 
(17)
Corruption
 
 
0,17414*** 
(2,597506)
0,241831*** 
(3,021918)
0,245176*** 
(3,083707)
0,200702*** 
(2,670364)
0,20612*** 
(2,749532)
0,133352** 
(2,086374)
0,14991* 
(2,000278)
0,216564*** 
(2,663850)
0,181673** 
(2,183555)
0,148450* 
(1,943210)
0,211415** 
(2,544062)
0,224129*** 
(2,717358)
0,215795** 
(2,518708)
0,196533** 
(1,985665)
0,19081* 
(1,923875)
0,146652* 
(1,716221)
GDP real growth 
rate (last five years)
0,05282*** 
(3,080535)
0,049858*** 
(3,036132)
0,05545** 
(2,369501)
0,068729*** 
(2,730191)
0,053053** 
(2,401271)
0,062338*** 
(2,624267)
0,048306*** 
(3,072128)
0,049516** 
(2,225363)
0,105624*** 
(4,761075)
0,106266*** 
(4,545588)
0,051078** 
(2,318047)
0,024008 
(0,932969)
0,0157 
(0,53544)
0,029617 
´(1,139264)
0,055486* 
(1,923746)
0,058258** 
(1,980611)
0,037323 
´(1,557133)
Log (GDP) 
1,276520*** 
(18,70763)
1,247555*** 
(18,18711)
1,241162*** 
(13,53844)
1,060627*** 
(8,484478)
1,149634*** 
(12,13814)
1,032838*** 
(8,328709)
1,236956*** 
(16,9563)
1,238987*** 
(13,28023)
 
 
1,149333*** 
(8,881673)
1,218822*** 
(11,80641)
0,909681*** 
(4,501197)
1,075480*** 
(7,531178)
0,953515*** 
(7,892166)
0,936112*** 
´(7,636661)
1,155633*** 
(11,64039)
Log (real GDP  
per capita)
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,000079* 
(1,927327)
 
 
0,000054 
(1,352182)
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,32351* 
(1,762532)
Human Capital
 
 
 
 
0,002417 
(0,537866)
0,005993 
(1,233155)
0,001265 
(0,275639)
0,003804 
(0,780839)
 
 
0,001861 
(0,406874)
0,010932** 
(2,246701)
0,012033* 
(2,458454)
0,001136 
(0,245737)
-0,004925 
(-1,040259)
-0,005994 
-(1,232882)
-0,004004 
(-0,844403)
0,000935 
(0,193524)
0,002947 
(0,602759)
-0.002498 
(-0,527636)
Trade openness
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,206319*** 
(3,729432)
1,114640*** 
(3,424598)
0,431982** 
(2,168803)
0,833561* 
(2,58242)
1,521836*** 
(4,621079)
1,292121*** 
(3,780948)
0,956415*** 
(3,019679)
1,445959*** 
(4,210576)
1,505165*** 
(4,344729)
1,692417*** 
(4,973687)
1,059009*** 
(2,796196)
1,111117*** 
(2,883776)
1,743197*** 
(5,479019)
Inflation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,003793** 
(2,295913)
0,005435*** 
(3,554896)
 
 
0,003622 
(1,504697)
0,005132*** 
(3,255892)
Labour  
productivity
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,00012*** 
(7,199826)
0,000129*** 
(7,565061)
1,03E-05 
(0,457659)
2,95E-05 
(1,131244)
Highest corporate  
marginal tax rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0,027192** 
(-2,016046)
-0,024749* 
(-1,845892)
Political Stability          
0,613376*** 
(4,159924)
0,649338*** 
´(4,321856)
0,71571*** 
(4,639508)
0,420715*** 
(2,681413)
Government  
Effectiveness
         
-0,45394** 
(-2,130999)
Business Freedom          
0,007494* 
(1,710781)
0.004162 
(0,821938)
 Rule of Law          
0,925475*** 
(3,623209)
R2 adjusted 0,897 0,897 0,896 0,897 0,899 0,899 0,897 0,897 0,887 0,882 0,896 0,900 0,903 0,902 0,891 0,890 0,904
DW 1,52 1,54 1,61 1,61 1,61 1,61 1,54 1,60 1,47 1,44 1,60 1,64 1,65 1,72 1,62 1,63 1,71
 F- statistic 6772 3365 1774 1339 1364 1094 1650 1060 1131 854 816 730 763 705 826 680 662
Probability  
(F-statistic)
0,000 0,000 0,000 0 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0 0 0 0,000 0,000 0,000
Number of  
observations
773 764 607 607 607 607 753 600 571 564 564 480 485 454 498 495 482
t values are in parentheses. Significance levels: *p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; *** p≤0.01.All regressions were carried out with fixed  
effects not reported in the table
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Conclusion
More countries are expanding abroad through FDI, and most countries are 
seeking to attract it due to the positive effects on their economies. FDI promotes 
job opportunities, income, technology transfer, human capital development, 
management skills and even better governance. To attract FDI a host country has to 
promote a favourable environment to investors. This also means transparent political 
institutions, that is, low corruption in order not to increase business costs. 
In this research it is clear that corruption is a crucial determinant of FDI inflows. 
The results also suggest that the market size, tax policies, a low burden of regulations 
that facilitates the installment and growth of companies, and a stable political 
environment are important factors for foreign investors. 
There has been a growing concern to combat corruption all over the world. A 
transparent business environment and public sector become less costly for firms, as 
users of public services and subjects to regulations, as well as clients for licenses and 
permits. In this way, countries which take effective measures to combat corruption, 
may attract more FDI than those who do not.
In this article we studied the impact of corruption on FDI, assuming a linear 
relationship. In light of some studies on the impact of corruption on economic 
growth (Okad et al, 2010; Castro, 2008; Mendéz and Sepúlveda, 2006), it would 
be important for future research to establish whether there may be a nonlinear 
relationship, that is, if the FDI inflow may be higher for cases with low levels of 
corruption but detrimental for those with high levels and, therefore, determining 
the critical level of corruption which maximizes the level of FDI.
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Data source and definitions 
Variable Description Source
FDI Inflows
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows- 
Direct investment in reporting economy 
(FDI Inward) in Millions of Dollars
United Nations 
Conference on Trade 
and Development 
(UNCTAD)
Corruption
Corruption Perception Index - Scale from 
0 to 10: 10 – very clean, 0 – highly corrupt
Transparency 
International
GDP
Gross Domestic Product - US Dollars at 
current prices and current exchange rates 
in millions
UNCTAD
Growth rate of 
real GDP over 
the past five years 
(%)
Calculated from GDP - US Dollars 
at constant prices (1990) and constant 
exchange rates (1990) in millions
UNCTAD
Human Capital School enrollment, secondary (% gross) World Bank
Trade Openness 
Exports plus Imports to GDP ratio; 
Exports, Imports and GDP: US Dollars at 
current prices and current exchange rates 
in millions
UNCTAD
Inflation (%) 
Percentage change in the index of 
consumer prices 
IMF, World Economic 
Outlook Database, April 
2010
Labour 
productivity
GDP per person employed - Constant 
1990 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) $
Worl Bank
Highest 
corporate 
marginal tax rate 
Highest marginal tax rate (corporate rate) is 
the highest rate shown on the schedule of 
tax rates applied to the taxable income of 
corporations
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Political Stability
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/
Terrorism - about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
values corresponding to better governance 
outcomes
Kaufmann et al (2009)
Government 
Effectiveness 
Government Effectiveness – about -2.5 to 
2.5, with higher values corresponding to 
better governance outcomes
Kaufmann et al (2009)
Rule of Law
Rule of Law - about -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher values corresponding to better 
governance outcomes
Kaufmann et al (2009)
Business 
Freedom 
Business Freedom - The business freedom 
score for each country is a number between 
0 and 100, with 100 equalling the freest 
business environment
Heritage Foundation

